Leading off this edition is Head v. Thomason from the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Thomason Court held that the court below was correct in finding that counsel missed key pieces of evidence in mitigation and relied too much on their subjective belief that the trial judge would never give death. The other reason Head v. Thomason leads the Hot List this week is who won the case, counsel recruited by ABA Death Penalty Representation Project, Matthew H. Feinberg and Matthew A. Kamholtz from Feinberg & Kamholtz in Boston.
The "In Focus" section is a copy of the "Briefbank" materials of the website which have been substantially overhauled in recent weeks. The new brief bank includes search engines that permits searching all briefs filed in the 8th Circuit since 2000, most Florida Supreme Court briefs since (at least) 1998, all Capital Defense Weekly material and the entire online database of motions (capital and noncapital) from the DC Federal Defenders. Also in the new brief bank are ipdated links to the brief banks of (almost) every online death penalty defense organization (available without password), as well as links to litigation guides on a wide variety of subjects. The "Briefbank" (http://www.capitaldefenseweekly.com/briefbank.html) will be a key focus for coming year & if something that should be there is missing please feel free to drop a line at cdw@capitaldefenseweekly.com. Note, the "testy" nature of the search engines contained below are the reason there no hot links in most of this edition.
The United States Supreme Court in a fairly technical plurality opinion in Woodford v. Garceau that can be reduced to simply "McFarland Motion" is not enough for a case to be "pending" before the district court, rather " a case does not become “pending” until an actual application for habeas corpus relief is filed in federal court." Other notable capital cases include Louisiana v. Edwards where the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded for a hearing on whether the relator is mentally retarded under Atkins. In Ex parte Jerry Jerome Smith the Alabama Supreme Court holds the appellant was improperly prevented from presenting mitigating evidence. The Florida Supreme Court in Harris v. Florida orders a new penalty phase proceeding as the pecuniary gain aggravator was unsupported by the evidence. Finally, the former Nebraska death penalty statute was held volitive of Ring v. Arizona by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Nebraska v Gales.
Finally, this is a critical time in Texas. Texas Defender Service has had several large wins recently but unfortunately TDS has extreme financial difficulties (foundations have not renewed grants, individual donors feel the effects of the economy, vouchers have been slashed, etc.). If you can help with a tax deductible donation please feel free to forward it to Texas Defender Service, 412 Main St, Suite 1150, Houston, TX 77002, or donate online at http://www.texasdefender.org/donations.htm.
The Weekly should be returning to its normal schedule in the coming weeks.
EXECUTION INFORMATION
The following person's have
been executed since the last edition:
MarchThe following persons received stays.
18 Louis Jones Florida
18 Walanzo Robinson Oklahoma
20 Keith Clay Texas
25 John Hooker Oklahoma
25 Larry Moon Georgia
26 James Colburn Texas
April
3 Scott Hain Oklahoma---juvenile
The following executions dates for the next few weeks that are considered serious:*
AprilHOT LIST
8 Don Hawkins Jr. Oklahoma
9 Earl Bramblett Virginia
15 Kenneth Morris Texas
17 Larry Jackson Oklahoma
22 Juan Chavez Texas
23 Robert Ladd Texas
24 Gary Brown Alabama
29 David Brewer Ohio
In granting relief, the habeas court noted that the mitigation evidence offered at trial consisted only of Thomason's profession of remorse, his lack of violent tendencies, testimony that he was easily influenced and was always with someone else when he got in trouble, and his mother's mention of his hospitalization at Charter Peachford Hospital for marijuana usage. The habeas court then chronicled the mitigation evidence trial counsel had and did not use n1 and the mitigation evidence trial counsel did not have but which was "readily obtainable through reasonable diligence." n2 The habeas court noted that trial counsel had testified at the hearing that the background information was not used or pursued because they believed it could not be used effectively without an expert and the trial court had denied their request for additional funding for a psychological evaluation. The habeas court found that counsel had not been reasonably diligent in their pursuit of expert assistance, had substantially abandoned Thomason's mitigation case, had unreasonably failed to make use of considerable information in counsel's [*4] possession, made no effort to secure other information readily available, and made no effort to pursue alternative possibilities for securing assistance from the psychiatrist who examined Thomason. Based on those findings, the habeas court found counsel's performance deficient, and further concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the death penalty would not have been imposed if counsel had effectively utilized the available information and resources.SUPREME COURTA habeas court's determination on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is to be affirmed unless the reviewing court concludes the habeas court's factual findings are clearly erroneous or are legally insufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel. See Head v. Carr, 273 Ga. 613, 616 (544 S.E.2d 409) (2001). Review of the record in this case persuades us that there is evidence to support the trial court's findings and that they are not, therefore, clearly erroneous. It remains our task to consider whether those facts support the legal conclusion that counsel were ineffective and that the ineffectiveness prejudiced Thomason. Id.
Mitigating evidence, "anything that might persuade the jury to impose a sentence less than death," ( Head v. Ferrell, 274 Ga. 399 (554 S.E.2d 155) (2001)), is critical in the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial since "the jury may withhold imposition of the death penalty for any reason, or without any reason." Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 787 (325 S.E.2d 362) (1985). We have recognized the importance of mitigating evidence by holding that the permissible scope of such evidence is wide [*7] ( Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345 (27) (496 S.E.2d 674) (1998)), and by noting that evidentiary rules are relaxed during the sentencing phase. Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 240 (12) (510 S.E.2d 1) (1998). The test for finding deficient performance of an attorney who is claimed to have been ineffective with regard to mitigating evidence is whether a reasonable lawyer would have acted the way defense counsel did. Head v. Carr, supra, 273 Ga. at 616. An attorney's failure to have a mental health expert review medical records for mitigating evidence can be unreasonable conduct. Turpin v. Lipham, 270 Ga. 208, 216 (510 S.E.2d 32) (1999). In the case at bar, defense counsel knew of two mental health experts who had spent time with Thomason - one a clinical psychologist who testified at the defendant's competency hearing that the defendant has an IQ of 77, and the other a psychiatrist who interviewed the defendant, who told defense counsel he saw in the defendant indications of intellectual impairment, low self-esteem, and depression, to whom defense counsel offered the defendant's school, medical, and institutional records as well [*8] as information about the crime for a forensic evaluation, but to whom the attorney never gave the offered material. In addition to failing to follow through on his promise to give the requested material to the psychiatrist, defense counsel called neither expert to present evidence in mitigation - and then presented none of the mitigatingg evidence the defense had amassed because counsel did not know how to do it without an expert.
Trial counsel recognized the need for expert testimony, yet failed to have the expert who had already conducted an interview with the defendant execute an affidavit for use in securing additional funding for the expert. Instead, trial counsel asked the expert for a letter breaking down the cost of a full forensic psychiatric evaluation of Thomasson. The expert's letter apparently served as the basis for trial counsel's request for an additional $ 25,000 for mental health expert assistance. When trial counsel's efforts to obtain the additional funding were rejected by the trial court, trial counsel never contacted the expert again. In an affidavit submitted at the habeas hearing and relied on by the habeas court, the expert stated he would have worked with [*9] counsel without further funding or for a figure significantly less than that set forth in his letter had that been necessary. The expert noted he could have reduced the cost by utilizing defense team members to conduct interviews rather than conducting them himself and, had he had the materials provided to him by habeas counsel, he would have been able to assist in providing evidence in mitigation. However, trial counsel never contacted the expert again once the request for additional funding was denied. We conclude, given the importance of mitigating evidence in death penalty cases, that an attorney has not acted reasonably when he fails to call mental health experts he knows have mitigating evidence and explains his failure to present lay mitigating evidence by asserting that he had no experts to call.
It is likely that trial counsel's guard was down at the sentencing phase due to counsel's belief that the trial judge who presided over the bench trial would not impose a death sentence. n3 While we agree with the habeas court's determination that trial counsel's advice to Thomason to waive his right to a jury trial based on counsel's erroneous assumptions about the trial judge did [*10] not alone amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that counsel's erroneous assumptions and the concomitant feeling of assuredness caused counsel to be less diligent in preparing for the sentencing phase than they would have had they believed they were dealing with a fact-finder who might impose the death penalty.
These circumstances, coupled with counsel's failure to make use of the mitigating evidence and the experts they had, persuade us that the habeas court was correct in its conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the presentation of the mitigating evidence presented at the habeas hearing would have changed the outcome of the sentencing phase of Thomasson's trial. See Head v. Carr, supra, 273 Ga. at 626. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of a new sentencing trial.
Amendments made to 28 U.S.C., ch. 153, by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to cases pending in federal court on April 24, 1996–AEDPA’s effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320. Respondent was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in California state court. After his petition for state postconviction relief was denied, he moved for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution in Federal District Court on May 12, 1995, and later filed a federal habeas application on July 2, 1996. Although he filed the habeas application after AEDPA’s effective date, the District Court concluded, inter alia, that it was not subject to AEDPA because his motions for counsel and a stay were filed prior to that date. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the application was not subject to AEDPA, but reversed for reasons not relevant here.CAPITAL CASES (Favorable Disposition)Held: For purposes of applying the Lindh rule, a case does not become “pending” until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in federal court. Respondent’s application is subject to AEDPA’s amendments because it was not filed until after AEDPA’s effective date. Pp. 2—8.
(a) Because of AEDPA’s heavy emphasis on the standards governing the review of a habeas application’s merits, the Court interprets the Lindh rule in view of that emphasis. Thus, whether AEDPA applies to a state prisoner turns on what was before a federal court on AEDPA’s effective date. If, on that date, the state prisoner had before a federal court a habeas application seeking an adjudication on the merits of the prisoner’s claims, then AEDPA does not apply. Otherwise, an application filed after AEDPA’s effective date should be reviewed under AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant–e.g., a request for the appointment of counsel or a motion for a stay of execution–were presented to a federal court prior to AEDPA’s effective date. A review of the amended chapter 153 supports this conclusion. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that, “[i]n a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” (Emphasis added.) Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, that presumption would rarely apply in a capital case, as §2254(e)(1) would be applicable only to those capital prisoners who did not need counsel and did not seek a stay. AEDPA’s text, however, contains no indication that §2254(e)(1) was intended to have such a limited scope. Nor is it reasonable to believe that Congress meant for a capital prisoner to avoid application of §2254(e)(1)’s stringent requirements simply by filing a request for counsel or a motion for a stay before filing an actual habeas application. Finally, the procedural rules governing §2254 cases reinforce the Court’s view. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the habeas context to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus Rules. Because nothing in the Habeas Rules contradicts Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3–“[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint”–the logical conclusion is that a habeas suit begins with the filing of a habeas application, the equivalent of a complaint in an ordinary civil case. Pp. 2—6.
(b) As the task here is to apply Lindh to an action under chapter 153, respondent’s request to look at provisions in chapter 154 is inapposite. Moreover, his reliance on McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, which involved the interpretation of §2251, not §2254, and must be understood in light of the Court’s concern to protect the right to counsel contained in 18 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), and Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, which says nothing about whether a request for counsel or motion for a stay suffices to create a “case” that is “pending” within the Lindh rule’s meaning, is misplaced. Pp. 6—7.
275 F.3d 769, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Ex parte Jerry Jerome Smith, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 79 (ALA 3/14/2003) Smith was improperly prevented from presenting mitigating evidence.
Harris v. Florida, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 458 (FL 3/27/2003) Error in instructing the jury on a pecuniary gain aggravator was unsupported by the evidence cannot be deemed harmless as to either the advisory sentence or the imposition of the death penalty. The jury was instructed on only two aggravators and insufficient evidence existed to support the pecuniary gain aggravator.
Nebraska v Gales, 2003 Neb. LEXIS 48;265 Neb. 598 (Neb 3/28/2003) Nebraska's prior death penalty statute declared volitive of Ring v. Arizona.
Bryant v. Alabama, 2003 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 82 (Ala. Crim. App. 3/21/2003) On remand from the state Supreme Court for an ordered evidentiary hearing as "Bryant was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because the circuit court's penalty- phase jury instructions implied that the jury could not recommend a penalty of life in prison without the possibility of parole instead of death unless the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances."
CAPITAL CASES (Unfavorable
Disposition)
Beardslee v. Woodford, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 5379 (9th Cir 3/20/2003) "The record indicates several
constitutional violations, including the court's failure to clarify guilt
phase instructions, the court's improper ex parte response to the juror
note, and the prosecutor's comments on Beardslee's refusal to testify.
Each of these potential errors is harmless . . .."
1
Hopkins v. Cockrell, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 5457 (5th Cir 3/20/2003) "Though we are troubled
by the state's methods by which it obtained Hopkins' confession, ultimately,
we conclude that its admission was harmless in light of the overwhelming
amount of circumstantial evidence presented to the jury and the state's
limited reliance on the confession. We also are unpersuaded by Hopkins'
contention that his counsel was ineffective. Hopkins' counsel was operating
under an objectively reasonable trial strategy in selecting the type of
mitigating evidence that was presented."
Hain v. Mullin, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 5549 (10th Cir 3/21/2003) (unpublished) A "McFarland motion" for appointment of counsel for purposes of clemency does not vest the district court with the power to grant a stay. [Note the subsequent opinion to follow in the next edition]
North Carolina v. Haselden, 2003 N.C. LEXIS 318 (NC 3/28/2003) (dissent) Noting a growing split in the circuits, the North Carolina Supreme Court upholds outside the record references to God & the Bible in closing arguments.
Murphy v. Oklahoma, 2003 OK CR 6;2003 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 3/21/2003). "The bottom line is that Appellant's adaptive functioning, including schooling and work history, and his 80 I.Q.- calculated with retardation in mind, with complete testing, and at a time when alcoholism should have had no impact on testing-all demonstrate Petitioner is not mentally retarded."
Duke v. Alabama, 2003 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 84 (Ala. Crim. App. 3/21/2003) Relief denied on claims related to Ring v. Arizona and proportionality.
Smith v. Missouri, 2003 Mo. LEXIS 47 (3/18/2003) Dismissal of post-conviction petition upheld as petitioner held competent to waive his collateral proceedings.
Ex parte Melvin G. Hodges, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 84 (ALA 3/14/2003) Judicial override provision in Alabama's capital sentencing scheme hold not to violate Apprendi & Ring, as well as, the trial court's error, if any, in restricting mitigating evidence during the penalty phase was harmless because the jurors recommended life imprisonment without parole by a vote of 8-4. I
Ohio v. Mitts, 2003 Ohio LEXIS 611;98 Ohio St. 3d 325; 2003 Ohio 1007 (Ohio 3/19/2003) "Mitts has failed to raise "a genuine issue as to whether [he] was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal" before the court of appeals"
Banks v. Florida, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 387 (FL 3/20/2003) Relief denied on claims that Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional in light of Ring and that "he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to seek the assistance of a mental health expert in order to explain the potential mitigating evidence concerning beatings Banks received from his father from the age of three to the age of around eleven or twelve and Banks' abuse of alcohol."
Sallie v. Georgia, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 279 (GA 3/24/2003) Sallie raised numerous issues on appeal, losing on all, including but not limited to the trial court's refusal to excuse six jurors for cause and the introduction of "victim-impact evidence in the guilt-innocence phase" of his trial.
Swearingen v. Texas, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 3/26/2003) Relief denied where corroboration between the forensic evidence and a letter written by defendant were sufficient to establish aggravating elements of the offense, and various suppression arguments are overruled.
California v. Jones, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 1544 (CA 3/17/2003) Relief denied, most notably, that lack of remorse was properly introduced during the penalty phase of trial to rebut guilt phase testimony regarding remorse.
Cleary v. Mullin, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 5927 (10th Cir 3/27/2003) Relief denied. "Cleary challenges only his death sentence, arguing that his trial attorneys' representation at the capital sentencing proceeding was constitutionally deficient because counsel failed to investigate and present expert psychological evidence in mitigation and should have had several additional family members testify on Cleary's behalf. We decline to address Cleary's challenge to the lack of a psychological expert, however, because Cleary has never specifically raised that particular claim until now."
Ohio v. Goff, 2003 Ohio LEXIS 615;2003 Ohio 1017 (Ohio 3/19/2003) "Goff has failed to raise "a genuine issue as to whether [he] was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal" before the court of appeals."
Reyes v. Delaware, 2003 Del. LEXIS 170 (Del 3/25/2003) "Reyes argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow open-ended questioning of jurors during voir dire regarding their views on the death penalty. Reyes also contends that the Superior Court erred in several evidentiary rulings and in denying his motion for a mistrial on the basis of two separate instances of alleged juror misconduct. Finally, Reyes challenges the constitutionality of the 1991 Delaware death penalty statute."
Arizona v. Montano, 2003 Ariz. LEXIS 22 (Ariz. 03/17/2003) Relief denied on claims including: [1] preindictment delay; [2] failure of the state to locate witnesses; [3] death qualification of the jury; [4] prosecutor's statements during voir dire; [5] sufficiency; [6] Brady allegations; [7] certain photographic evidence; [8] evidence relating to gang activity; [9] sanitizing the prior convictions of a key witness; [10] admission of hearsay; [11] prosecutorial misconduct; and [12] failure to appoint a second counsel on appeal.
Lawrence v. Florida, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 386 (FL 3/20/2003) Relief denied on "claims that (1) the trial court erred by failing to order a competency hearing for Lawrence; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to admit into evidence facts in support of the substantial domination mitigator and then rejecting that mitigator; (3) the trial court erred by finding the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator; (4) the trial court erred by issuing a defective and unreliable sentencing order; (5) Florida's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional; (6) the trial court erred in allowing a lay witness to testify to an opinion reserved for experts (raised in supplemental briefing); and (7) Lawrence's death sentence is disproportionate."
Grim v. Florida, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 384 (FL 3/20/2003) Grim argues unsuccessfully that: [1] despite the mitigation presented to the trial court, it erred by giving great weight to the jury's recommendation even though the jury was never presented mitigation in the penalty phase; [2] the trial court should have required special counsel to present mitigating evidence to the penalty phase jury notwithstanding the defendant's vocal objection; [3] the trial court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights when it refused to allow him to present his only defense--the victim's hearsay statements to Jan Wallace and Charles Worrel demonstrating that someone else could have killed Cynthia Campbell; [4] proportionality; and [5] constitutionality of the Florida statute in light of Ring v. Arizona.
Tennessee v. Davis, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. 3/25/2003) Relief denied on claims that "(1) The trial court erred by not granting the Appellant's motion to disqualify [the local prosecutor]; (2) the trial court erred by not granting the Appellant's motion to prohibit the State from relying upon the Appellant's prior murder conviction as an aggravating circumstance, because the conviction was for a crime committed while the Appellant was a juvenile; (3) the trial court erred by not suppressing the statement the Appellant made to police; (4) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel's motion to be allowed to withdraw from representing the Appellant; (5) the trial court erred by granting the State's motion to require the Appellant to supply the State information concerning mental health expert testimony to be presented during the sentencing phase of the trial; (6) the trial court erred by allowing a physician who did not perform the autopsy to testify concerning the autopsy and evidence obtained in connection therewith; (7) the trial court erred in allowing victim impact evidence to be introduced; (8) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (9) that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; (10) that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding that the aggravating factors were established beyond a reasonable doubt; (11) that Tennessee's death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional in several instances; (12) that the trial court erred in allowing certain cross-examination of defense witnesses; and (13) that the cumulative effect of errors made at trial denied the Appellant a fair trial in violation of his due process rights."
NOTABLE NONCAPITAL
CASES
United States v. McCoy,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 5378 (9th Cir 3/20/2003) "We hold that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) [a child pornography statute] is unconstitutional
as applied to simple intrastate possession of a visual depiction (or depictions)
that has not been mailed, shipped, or transported interstate and is not
intended for interstate distribution, or for any economic or commercial
use, including the exchange of the prohibited material for other prohibited
material."
New Jersey v. Jang, 2003 N.J. Super. LEXIS 115 (NJ App Div 3/28/2003) Vienna Convention claims may be litigated in the courts of New Jersey, however such claims must show injury.
Monroe v. Angelone No. 02-6548, 02-6625 (4th Cir 03/26/2003) Habeas granted on the suppression of key Brady evidence including evidence that labeled the decedent's death an accident.
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